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To Preserve, Protect, and Defend: An
Imminent Threat Approach to Resolving the




Throughout the history of the United States, various Presidents have
relied upon their inherent powers to justify action they believed was for
the good of the nation.' In order to do what they thought best, they have
acted in ways resulting in an expansion of their powers beyond those
explicitly granted to them through either the Constitution or any statute.
This oft-repeated expansion of presidential power in times of crisis begs
the question whether these actions have amounted to a true expansion of
presidential powers, or were instead merely a part of some kind of
ancillary, "inherent" power, held by the President solely due to his status
as the chief executive officer. This Comment will examine the so-called
"inherent" powers of the president, beginning with an exploration of
historical ideas about inherent powers, such as those of the founders and
pre-founding thinkers. The Comment will then analyze the thoughts of
various presidents concerning the existence of inherent powers before
moving on to an analysis of relevant case law addressing inherent
powers. Next, the Comment will discuss American Civil Liberties Union
v. National Security Agency, a recent federal court decision in which a
district judge roundly struck down the notion of inherent presidential
powers.2 Combining all these sources, the Comment will finally analyze
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2008; B.A., James Madison University, 2005.
1. See 88 CONG. REC. 7044 (1942). See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress
in Special Session, (July 4, 1861), http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/
index.asp?document= 1063.
2. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D.
Mich. 2006) [hereinafter ACLU].
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the existence of inherent powers and establish a framework for
understanding inherent powers in this day and age.
In order to adequately discuss inherent powers, one must first
determine what is meant by the term "inherent powers." Black's Law
Dictionary defines "inherent power" as "a power that necessarily derives
from an office, position, or status.",3 To elaborate further, this is a power
that is not explicitly delegated to an office, position, or status; instead, it
merely exists as a necessity to the execution of an office. This Comment
will utilize Black's definition of "inherent power," with a specific
emphasis on the powers of the President. Essentially, "inherent power"
under this framework means an implicit power necessarily granted to the
President through the Vesting Clause,4 the Take Care Clause,5 and the
Presidential Oath to "preserve, protect, and defend the constitution of the
United States."6
II. Historical and Contemporary Thoughts on Inherent Powers
A. Pre-Founding Thought
Dating back as early as Plato's Republic, philosophers have
7concerned themselves with the appropriate scope of executive powers.
One political theorist of particular relevance is John Locke, who set forth
his notion of executive power nearly a century before ratification of the
Constitution.8 In his Second Treatise on Government, Locke spoke of
three kinds of power possessed by the executive department. 9 He found
that laws have a "constant and lasting force" and need "perpetual
execution;" therefore, there must be a "power always in being" to see to
the execution of the laws.' ° This first power is essentially akin to the
"law-enforcement" view of the executive:'" the President exists to carry
out congressional mandates.12 Locke went on to speak of what he termed
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1208 (8th ed. 2004).
4. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
5. "[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id. § 3.
6. Id.§l.
7. See generally PLATO, REPUBLIC, in PLATO COMPLETE WORKS 971 (John M.
Cooper, ed., 1997).
8. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L.
REv 1, 12 (1992) (comparing the Lockean understanding of presidential powers to the
American understanding of presidential powers) [hereinafter Monaghan].
9. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 76 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
1980).
10. Id.
11. Monaghan, supra note 8, at 12.
12. Id. at 3 (arguing that the Constitution only establishes a law enforcement
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the "federative" power, which "contains the power of war and peace,
leagues and alliances, with all persons and communities without the
commonwealth.... ,13 This second power directly correlates to Section
2 of Article II, where the President's commander-in-chief, treaty making,
and administrative powers are outlined. '
4
Finally, Locke described what he called the "prerogative power,"
which he stated is the "power to act according to discretion, for the
public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even
against it.' 5 This statement seems to encompass what is meant by the
inherent powers of the President-acting according to discretion for the
public good without explicit statutory or constitutional mandate. Locke
further supported this notion when he wrote that "prerogative is nothing
but the power of doing public good without a rule.' 16 Essentially, Locke
seemed to support the doctrine of inherent powers, when he determined
that in governments the lawmaking power is often too slow, or not
always in being,' 7 which therefore necessitates a quick-acting body to
take the necessary action.18 Thus, Locke strongly believed in the need
for inherent power of the executive, even arguing that this power may
sometimes enable the executive to act contrary to the law.' 9
B. Thoughts of the Founders
The most obvious method to ascertaining the thoughts of the
Founders on Constitutional issues is through The Federalist Papers.
Comprising a series of published essays written individually by
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, or James Madison, the Federalist Papers
arose during the constitutional ratification process as a defense to the
Constitution. 20 It provides a unique insight into the thoughts of the
Framers as they energetically defend their proposed government.
The Federalist Papers speak to the need for a vigorous executive.
"[E]nergy in the executive," Hamilton wrote, "is a leading character in
the definition of good government."'', Hamilton primarily seemed to be
executive).
13. LOCKE, supra note 9, at 76.
14. See supra note 4, § 2.
15. LOCKE, supra note 9, at 84.
16. Id. at 87.
17. This could aptly be compared to our congressional sessions, where the law
making power is sometimes in hiatus.
18. See LOCKE, supra note 9, at 84.
19. See id.
20. CHARLES KESLER, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS vii, vii-viii (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999) [hereinafeter KESLER, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS].
21. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 70 (1788), in KESLER, THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS, at 421.
2007]
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speaking of the execution and administration of laws and defense of the
12country, all areas specifically enumerated within the Constitution.
What is more telling, though, is the absence of any mention of
presidential prerogative, inherent power, or any sort of indication that the
President has any power not explicitly stated within the Constitution.
23
Though Hamilton spoke of an energetic executive, the executive may
presumably be energetic while acting only within the limits of those
powers specifically delegated to him or her by the Constitution.
Even more informative on this account is the actual record of the
Constitutional Convention. Madison's studious notes reveal that he
himself suggested adding a clause to Article 1I allowing the President to
"execute such Powers, not legislative nor judiciary in their nature, as
may from time to time be delegated by the national legislature. 2 4 This
measure was rejected by the members of the convention.25 Implicit in
this rejection is the notion that the Founders so wished to limit the
President's powers that they hesitated to even allow him to exercise
additional power conferred on him by Congress. One could hardly argue
that, after imposing this limitation, the Founders would have wanted the
President to have countless intangible powers merely due to his office.26
C. Presidential Thought
As mentioned previously, several Presidents have invoked the
doctrine of inherent powers in order to justify actions they have taken
during times of national crisis.27  Others have merely spoken
hypothetically about the existence of a power to act either in the absence
of a congressional mandate, or even contrarily to it. 28 One of the earliest
Presidents to opine on the inherent powers of the chief executive was
22. See id. at 421-22.
23. See generally id.
24. 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(frOO 134)).
25. See id.
26. Obviously, this logic is not without its flaws. One cannot place too much
credence in the inaction of legislative bodies, without overwhelming proof that the failure
to act was due to the particular reason stated. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 600 (1983). Therefore, without knowing more about specifically why the
measure was rejected, one should be hesitant to place much weight on the significance of
its rejection as evidence of legislative thought.
27. See generally Lincoln, supra note 1; see also Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 584; 88
Cong. Rec. 7044.
28. See generally Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin, A LAW BEYOND
THE CONSTITUTION (Sept. 20, 1810), http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=
JefLett.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&
part-204&division=divl; Interview with Richard Nixon, Former President of the United
States, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1977, at A16.
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Thomas Jefferson. In a letter to a contemporary, Jefferson spoke of the
need of those "who accept great charges" to "risk themselves on great
occasions" when the welfare of the country, or other such lofty interests
were at stake.29 Jefferson went on to say that a good officer should draw
the line between strict obedience to orders, and transgressing them for
the greater good, at his own risk, with hopes that the public will support
his action.30 Though obedience to laws is important, Jefferson argued,
"the laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when
in danger, are of higher obligation.",31 Implicit within these statements is
the condition that the officer has the power to act contrary to the law
when it is, in his estimation, for the public good. As Jefferson did not
speak on the delegation of this power, one can only conclude that it is
inherent in one's status as a "good officer," or, as he states earlier in the
letter, the "Executive of the Union."
32
Abraham Lincoln similarly advocated the ability of the President to
act contrarily to the law during times of national emergency.33 During
the Civil War, Lincoln greatly infringed upon individual rights through
conscription, arrests, and suspension of habeas corpus.34 In order to
justify acting in contravention of positive law, Lincoln addressed
Congress in Special Session in 1861. Identifying and defending his
actions, Lincoln asked them, should "all the laws, but one... go
unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be
violated? '36 As the majority of laws were not being executed in nearly
one-third of the states, Lincoln argued that the breaking of a few laws
was justified in order to save the nation.37 Though the Constitution itself
speaks to powers to be executed in case of an emergency (such as the
suspension of habeas corpus), it is silent with regard to who should
execute them.38 As such, Lincoln found it absurd that the Framers
intended that whatever threat was facing the nation should continue until
Congress could be convened to act upon it.39 The President must have
the power to act in such times, even though such powers have not been
explicitly delegated to him by statute or the Constitution.4 °




33. See Monaghan, supra note 8, at 27 (citing JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 36-37 (1926)).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Lincoln, supra note 1
37. See id.
38. See generally U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
39. See Lincoln, supra note 1.
40. See id.
2007]
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While Lincoln acted first, and then justified his actions to Congress,
President Roosevelt acted in the inverse manner, demanding that
Congress repeal certain provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act
in 1942,41 arguing that he would act if Congress failed to do SO. 4 2 Like
Lincoln and Jefferson before him, Roosevelt also believed in the idea of
inherent presidential powers, as evidenced by his statement that "[t]he
President has powers, under the Constitution and under congressional
acts, to take measures necessary to avert disaster to interfere with the
winning of the war., 43 He went on to swear that he would use every
power vested in him to accomplish this end.44 As Congress acquiesced
to his request and repealed the necessary aspects of the Emergency Price
Control Act,45 Roosevelt did not use his powers to stabilize wages and
farm prices. However, his assertion that he would act if Congress did
not, and his reliance upon powers vested within him, indicates that he,
like Lincoln and Jefferson, believed in the existence of inherent
presidential powers.
Harry Truman was yet another widely known proponent of inherent
executive power. Though Truman's effect on the idea of inherent
powers, specifically concerning the events surrounding Steel Seizure,
will be discussed in greater detail later, it bears a brief mention at this
juncture. In 1951, a dispute between the major steel companies and their
employees led to a nationwide strike of steel workers.4 6 After federal
mediation tactics failed, President Truman, fearing that the strike would
jeopardize the national defense, as steel was a major component of
virtually all weapons, issued Executive Order 10340, directing the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession of the vast majority of steel
companies to keep them running.47
When the steel companies filed suit in federal court, the United
States argued that even a brief disruption of steel production would
jeopardize national security; therefore, the President had the inherent
power to take the actions he did.48 The United States went on to argue
that this inherent power was "supported by the Constitution, historical
precedent, and by court decisions. 4 9  Though the Supreme Court
ultimately ruled against the government, Truman's actions mark an




45. See generally Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 765 (1942).
46. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 582
(1952).
47. See id.
48. See id. at 584.
49. Id.
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important example of presidential assertion of inherent power.50
Though widely known for his arguments concerning executive
privileges, Richard Nixon was a similarly vocal proponent of a
presidential prerogative, though he espoused this support not during his
presidency, but in the years following his resignation.51 In Nixon's view,
when the President decides that a particular action is in the best interests
of the nation, by definition, that action is not illegal.52 This way, the
President's subordinates can carry out his orders without finding
themselves acting contrarily to the law. To use the facts of Steel Seizure
as an example, Nixon would argue that, by definition, the Secretary of
Commerce was acting legally when he nationalized the steel mills. If
such action were not legal solely because it was ordered by the
President, the Secretary would have been placed in the unfortunate
position of either disobeying the President, or acting contrary to the law.
In order for the Secretary not to be caught in this legalistic catch-22,
Nixon would argue, presidential orders must be legal solely by virtue of
being presidential orders.53
D. Pre-ACLU Case Law Concerning Inherent Powers
Having given a brief discussion of various executive views about
the existence of inherent presidential power, it now becomes useful to
provide a short exploration of two Supreme Court cases prior to ACLU
that have attempted to address the doctrine of presidential power:
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure)54 and Dames &
Moore v. Regan. 
55
1. Steel Seizure: Three Classifications of Presidential Action
One would be hard-pressed to find a legal scholar who was not
thoroughly familiar with Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, more
commonly known as Steel Seizure.5 6 The case is central to any
50. See id. at 589.
51. See Interview with Richard Nixon, supra note 28, at A16.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See generally Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
55. See generally Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
56. Indeed, entire law review volumes have been dedicated to the effects of Steel
Seizure upon current legal issues. See generally Ken Gormley, Forward: President
Truman and the Steel Seizure Case, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 667 (2003); President Truman and
the Steel Seizure Case: A 50-Year Retrospective: Transcript of Video Interview Between
Professor Ken Gormley and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 681
(2003); Dr. Maeva Marcus, Will Youngstown Survive, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 725 (2003); David
E. Feller, Thoughts about the Steel Seizure Case, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 735 (2003); Milton
Kayne, A View from Inside: Working with President Truman on the Steel Seizure Case,
2007]
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discussion of presidential action, and of particular importance when
construing the inherent powers of the President. As the proposed
framework of this Comment will utilize certain aspects of Steel Seizure,
it warrants a thorough discussion at this juncture.
As previously mentioned, Steel Seizure arose during the height of
the Korean War, in 1952. 57 Steel workers throughout America had not
received a wage increase since 1950, which led to a dispute between
steel companies and their employees in 1951.58 Realizing the impasse
between the two parties, the President referred them to the Federal Wage
Stabilization Board, so that the Board could make findings and
recommendations to help avert a strike and resume negotiations between
the groups. 59 However, the steel companies rejected these suggestions,
leading the steel workers to declare that they would soon strike.
60
Fearing that such a strike would endanger American lives and national
security by paralyzing the steel industry, Truman authorized the Federal
Government to nationalize the steel mills, thereby placing the steel
industry under government control.61  Specifically, Truman's order
directed the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of the steel
mills. 62 To accomplish this end, the Secretary ordered the presidents of
the seized companies to serve as operating managers of the mills
pursuant to his instructions.63
Though obedient to the orders of the Secretary, the steel companies
filed suit in district court, arguing that a seizure of the companies was
supported neither by congressional act nor constitutional provisions.
64
41 DUQ. L. REV. 751 (2003); Philip Bobbitt, Youngstown: Pages from the Book of
Disquietude, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 3 (2002); Neal Devins and Louis Fisher, The Steel
Seizure Case: One of a Kind?, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 63 (2002); Patricia L. Bellia,
Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87 (2002); David
Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 155 (2002); Michael Stokes Paulson, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 215 (2002).
57. See Gormley, supra note 56, at 667-68.
58. See id.
59. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S at 582. Created by President Truman, the Federal
Wage Stabilization Board existed in order to regulate wages and prices concerned with
key industries throughout the Korean War, so as to prevent massive economic flux as a
result of the war. See Gormley, supra note 40, at 667-68; see also MAEVA MARCUS,
TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1st ed.
1977).
60. See Gormley, supra note 56, at 668.
61. See id. It is interesting to reflect upon the seemingly universal condemnation of
Truman's action. National newspapers denounced the decision as "leaping socialism,"
going so far as to make comparisons between Truman and Hitler and Mussolini. See id.
at 669.
62. See id. at 669.
63. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 583.
64. See id. at 583-84.
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Therefore, they argued, the seizure was unconstitutional, and the court
should issue permanent injunctions restraining enforcement of the
orders.65 Opposing these injunctions, the United States argued that "the
President had inherent power to do what he had done-power supported
by the Constitution, by historical precedent, and by court decisions. 66
The district court found against the government on all counts, finding
"utter and complete lack of authoritative support" for the President's
actions.67 After the court of appeals stayed the order, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.68
In affirming the judgment of the district court, the Supreme Court
held that if the President had power to issue the order to seize the steel
mills, it must have been established through either the United States
Constitution, or an act of Congress.69  Not only were there no
congressional acts granting such authority in these circumstances, such
authority had previously been considered by Congress and explicitly
rejected.7° Similarly, no explicit grant of such authority was found in the
Constitution. 71  The Constitution explicitly states that the legislative
powers lie in the hands of Congress; the President exists to execute
congressional policy in a manner described by Congress.72 The Court
found that Truman's order instead "direct[ed] that a presidential policy
be executed in a manner prescribed by the President., 73 While Congress
could certainly authorize such seizures in times of national emergency,
the Constitution unequivocally states that such law-making powers are
solely granted to Congress, not to be subjected to presidential control.74
While the majority opinion remains important for its apparent
rejection of any inherent powers of the President, history has proven
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion to be the most influential of the
65. See id.
66. Id. at 584.
67. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 576 (D.D.C. 1952).
68. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 584.
69. Id. at 585.
70. See id. at 586. To reach this conclusion, the majority looked to the legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, finding that Congress had rejected an amendment
to the Act that would have allowed for similar governmental seizures in times of
emergency. See id. Though Justice Black makes a valid point, it is inherently fallacious
to place much weight on congressional rejection of a certain measure or amendment. See
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983). Lack of congressional
action can only say so much about Congress's thoughts on a particular issue. Bills and
amendments are rejected for a plethora of different reasons, many of which may have
nothing to do with explicit disapproval of the sort that Justice Black is alleging. See id.
71. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 587.
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several opinions offered in the case.75 At nearly four times the length of
the majority, Justice Jackson's opinion proves immensely useful in
determining the extent of presidential powers. Essentially, the opinion
divides presidential action into three different categories: action
pursuant to express congressional authorization; action with neither an
express grant nor denial of congressional authorization; and, finally,
action contrary to the express or implied will of Congress.76 According
to Justice Jackson, when the President is acting in accord with an express
grant from Congress, "his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all
that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. 77
When acting in this right, the President is granted the widest latitude for
judicial deference; if his actions are found to be unconstitutional, it is the
entire federal government, not specifically the President, who lacks
power.78 Justice Jackson went on to postulate that were the President's
order to seize the steel mills accomplished pursuant to an act of
Congress, its attackers would face an uphill battle in order to overcome
the presumption of legitimacy.79 Jackson contrasts this situation with the
occasion where the President acts with neither explicit grant nor denial. 80
In these instances, the President must rely upon his own independent
powers, though there is a slight area where his powers and those of
Congress overlap. 81 The Justice hypothesizes that these instances will be
judged on a largely case-by-case basis, dependent upon the variables of
the particular events.82
Finally, Justice Jackson speaks of occasions when the President acts
in a manner contrary to the expressed or implied will of Congress.83 In
such instances, he may only depend on his own constitutional powers,
not including those explicitly granted to Congress in that area.84 As
such, courts may only sustain presidential authority at the expense of
75. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct 2749 (2006) (adopting Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion from Steel Seizure); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981) (adopting Justice Jackson's concurring opinion from Steel Seizure).
76. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 636-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 635.
78. See id. at 636.
79. See id. at 637.
80. See id.
81. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637.
82. See id. It is interesting to note that at this point in his concurrence, Justice
Jackson cites to the myriad cases concerning President Lincoln's suspension of habeas
corpus during the Civil War as examples of instances where a President was acting
neither contrary to nor pursuant to congressional mandate. See id. at 637 n.3. As the
Constitution states, habeas corpus may be suspended in certain circumstances, but it does
not specify as to which branch or body may suspend it. Justice Jackson finds this to be
an example of presidential action under the grouping. See id.
83. See id. at 637-38.
84. See id.
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preventing congressional action in that particular arena.85
2. Dames & Moore v. Regan: Applying Steel Seizure to Carter's
Response to a National Emergency
One of the predominant cases first applying Steel Seizure was
Dames & Moore v. Regan, decided in 1981.86 In response to the seizure
of the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979, President Carter, acting
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),
declared a national emergency and "blocked the removal or transfer of
'all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its
instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran
which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States....
In ordering the transfer of Iranian assets, the President cited five
sources of express or inherent power to act.88 However, when the actions
were challenged in court, the government argued that the nullification
and transfer orders were specifically authorized by the IIEPA.8 9 The
Supreme Court agreed, and, quoting Steel Seizure, held that as the
President's actions in nullifying attachments and ordering the transfer of
assets were pursuant to specific statutory authority, they were "supported
by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any
who might attack it." 90
The Court was not so quick to approve the presidential suspension
of legal claims, as such action was not specifically authorized by either
the IEEPA or other statutory authority. 9' Instead, the Court found that
the failure of Congress to delegate authority should not be taken to imply
congressional disapproval of a particular action, especially in the areas of
85. See id at 638.
86. See generally Dames & Moore v. Regan, 464 U.S. 654 (1981).
87. Id. at 663 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 CFR 457 (1980)). In 1981, after
the hostages were released President Carter went on to revoke all licenses "permitting the
exercise of 'any right, power, or privilege' with regard to Iranian Funds, securities, or
deposits; nullif[y] all non-Iranian interests in such assets" acquired after the 1979 order;
and finally mandated banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them to the Federal
Reserve. Id. at 665-66. These actions were undertaken in order to implement an
agreement concerning the release of hostages and the settlement of United States claims
against Iran. See id. at 665. President Reagan continued this implementation by
suspending claims relating to Iranian assets that were currently pending in American
courts. See id. at 675.
88. See id. at 669.
89. See id. at 670.
90. See id. at 674 (quoting Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
91. See id. at 677.
20071
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92foreign policy and national security. Contrarily, congressional
enactment of legislation closely related to the question of presidential
authority that demonstrates intent to grant broad presidential discretion
may be considered to "invite 'measures on independent presidential
responsibility."'' 93 Previous statutes closely related to the presidential
action similarly indicated that Congress had implicitly approved such
action.94  This previous approval, combined with the long-continued
executive practice in this regard, a practice acquiesced to by Congress,
led the Court to find that the presidential actions were constitutional.95
Essentially, such congressional acquiescence to presidential action
places the action within the second category of Justice Jackson's
framework. Though the actions are not pursuant to express
congressional authorization, past congressional acquiescence to similar
action will lend support to the action. Therefore, the validity of the
action "hinges on a consideration of all the circumstances which might
shed light on the views of [Congress]. 96
III. ACLUv. NSA: A Definitive End to Inherent Powers?
In 2002,97 President Bush authorized a secret program, known as the
"terrorist surveillance program," (TSP) to intercept, without warrant,
phone and internet communications conducted internationally.98 The
program targets communications involving at least one party outside of
the United States, where the government "has reasonable grounds to
believe that at least one party to the communication is a member or agent
of al Qaeda, or an affiliated terrorist organization." 99 No explanation is
given as to what body decides whether the belief of terrorist involvement
is reasonable. 00
92. See id. at 678 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981)).
93. Id. (quoting Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
94. See id. at 680-81.
95. Seeid. at 681.
96. id.
97. As the President's authorization and the communication intercept program are
both secret, the specific date of the communication intercept program's inception is
unknown. The Administration has acknowledged their existence and authorization at
some point during 2002. See Press Conference of the President,
http://www.whitehouse.gove/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-2.html. For a detailed
legal defense of the secret program, see Prepared Statement of the Hon. Alberto R.
Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States, http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=1 727&witid=3936.
98. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758
(2006).
99. Gonzales, supra note 97.
100. See generally id. (thorough explanation of TSP fails to provide any details as to
its supervision).
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Plaintiffs brought suit, challenging the constitutionality of the
TSP.'' Plaintiffs regularly conducted international telephone and
internet communications, for myriad legitimate reasons such as
journalism, legal practice, and academic scholarship.10 2 As many such
communications occurred with Middle Eastern individuals, Plaintiffs
alleged both that they were subjected to governmental interception of
their communications and that the TSP had resulted in a chilling effect
upon their constitutionally protected communications. 103 Foreign
contacts would no longer speak with them, fearing repercussions of the
governmental monitoring.1
0 4
In defending the suit, the government argued, among other things,
that the ability to authorize the TSP fell within the inherent power of the
President. 10 5 In an earlier statement given to the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales attempted to defend
the TSP, asserting that "[t]he terrorist surveillance program is firmly
grounded in the President's constitutional authorities .... Presidents
have repeatedly relied on their inherent power to gather foreign
intelligence for reasons both diplomatic and military. ,.06 Gonzales
went on to say that federal courts have consistently upheld such
practices, yet cited but a single case to demonstrate this supposed
consistency. 0 7 The President's responsibility to protect the safety of the
American public gives him the ability to intercept such transmissions,
according to Gonzales.'
0 8
In her twenty-nine page opinion, District Judge Anna Taylor found
that the TSP violated statutory law, the First and Fourth Amendments,
and the separation of powers doctrine, and ordered a permanent
injunction of the TSP.10 9 In this lengthy opinion, Judge Taylor took the
time to specifically address the government's argument concerning
inherent power authority for the TSP: "[t]he Government appears to
argue here that, pursuant to the penumbra of Constitutional language in
Article II,... [the President] has been granted the inherent power to
violate not only the laws of the Congress but the First and Fourth




105. See id. at 780.
106. Gonzales, supra note 97.
107. See id. (erroneously citing In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (U.S. Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review 2002) to demonstrate supposed consistency of
federal approval of actions authorized by the President's inherent powers).
108. See id.
109. See ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
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Amendments of the Constitution itself."" She goes on to cite Steel
Seizure, finding that when similar inherent powers arguments have been
raised by the Government, the Court has held that "the President had
been created Commander in Chief of only the military, and not of all the
people, even in time of war.""' While the President does have vast
power to obtain foreign intelligence, as noted by Gonzales," 12 this power
does not extend so far as to grant him immunity from Constitutional
constraints." 3 No emergency can create previously unvested presidential
power. 1 14
IV. Analysis: Establishing a Framework for Inherent Powers
A. Introduction: Re-establishing the Question
While Justice Taylor's view of inherent presidential power--or,
specifically, of the non-existence thereof-is in accord with the majority
holdings of Steel Seizure and Dames & Moore, it flies in the face of the
views of a substantial number of aforementioned Presidents and
presidential advisors, including Jefferson, Lincoln, Roosevelt, Truman,
and Nixon, as well as President Bush. 1 5 Despite Steel Seizure and its
myriad citations with approval in the five decades since it appeared,
Presidents continue to argue for the existence of inherent power. Though
the Presidents frequently have legitimate reasons to act in such a manner,
their inherent powers are continually asserted as further justification. 1
6
So where does the notion of inherent powers stand at this juncture?
May the President rely upon his inherent powers in order to approach
what he believes to be a national crisis with a "shoot first, ask questions
later" philosophy, as seems to be promoted by Jefferson, Lincoln, and
Roosevelt? If not, is he prohibited from acting "in a moment of genuine
emergency, when the Government must act with no time for
deliberation," as suggested by Justice Souter in a 2004 concurrence as an
instance where a President may sidestep the Bill of Rights in order to
deter an "imminent threat to the safety of the Nation?" ' 1 7 In such cases,
110. See id. at 780.
111. Seeid.at781.




115. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 28; see also 88 CONG. REc. 7044,
supra note 1; Monaghan, supra note 8, at 27; Marcus, supra note 59, at 116; Interview
with Richard Nixon, supra note 28, at A 16; Gonzales, supra note 97.
116. See generally Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654.
117. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).
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it would seem necessary that the President be able to swiftly act to avert
disaster. This is a problem the remainder of this Comment will attempt
to solve.
In order to solve this constitutional riddle, this Comment will
develop a framework for understanding the inherent powers of the
President. Applying the thoughts of various Presidents, as well as
aspects of the reasoning of City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,1 18 this
Comment will set forth a test to be used when determining the
constitutionality of presidential behavior, when the President acts in the
absence of statutory or constitutional authority.
To better frame the issue, it is useful at this point to divide the
inherent powers question into two separate inquiries. First, when is the
President justified in acting solely on the basis of his inherent powers?
Absent explicit congressional or constitutional authority, may he act
whenever he deems it to be in the best interest of the nation, or is there a
threshold that must be reached before action is justified? The second
question is a corollary to the first: if such action is justified, when, and to
what extent, may it infringe upon individual liberties?
B. A Threshold for Action: Imminent Threats to the Safety of the
Nation
Prior to addressing the first question, it is useful to reflect on the
categories of sources that have been addressed thus far in order to
determine which will be most beneficial to the analysis. Generally, this
Comment has explored three types of sources: presidential writings, case
law, and independent political thoughts. Of those three, the ideas of the
Presidents and the holdings of various cases will prove to be the most
important in answering the first issue. The importance of the holdings is
obvious: our legal system is largely based on the idea of precedent, with
much of our current law being formed through judicial opinions. 119 The
importance of the presidential thought is perhaps less immediately
intuitive, but no less logical: throughout the history of the United States,
only forty-two individuals have been placed in the position to best
determine what action is truly in the best interests of the nation. The
President and his predecessors are the only ones who have ever been in
the position where the weight of the nation is literally upon their
118. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond is a seemingly unrelated but remarkably
applicable Supreme Court case concerning the constitutionality of drug interdiction
checkpoints. See generally Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
119. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("Indeed,
the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires
such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition,
indispensable.").
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shoulders. As such, their views must be accorded appropriate weight and
deference.
Observing some of the similarities between presidential thought and
case law can provide guidance at this point; if a consensus among these
two categories of thought can be established, such consensus will be
helpful in establishing a standard for the use of inherent powers.
Jefferson believed that "the laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of
saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation" than a strict
adherence to established law.'20 Therefore, a President should not let the
nation fall to ruin in order to obey current statutory law to the letter.
Lincoln similarly believed that the national security was of greater
importance than the strict adherence to law.121 President Roosevelt
believed the same, as demonstrated by his assertions that he would "take
matters necessary to avert disaster" with or without congressional
approval. 122 Finally, President Truman's seizure of the steel industry
indicates his acquiescence to the notion that preserving the nation was
more important than abiding strictly to statutory law.
123
Apart from the similarity of the beliefs of those Presidents
concerning inherent power, another similarity becomes readily apparent:
with the exception of Jefferson, each President took action, or threatened
to take action, in the face of a national emergency. Lincoln was in the
midst of a horrendous civil war; if he delayed acting until he gained
congressional approval, there was a significant chance that the nation
would crumble. 124  Roosevelt was in the midst of World War II-
winning the war was of the utmost priority to the security of the
nation. 12 The same could be said of Truman's actions during the Korean
War.126  Thus, one may argue that under the thoughts of several
Presidents, action may be taken under the guise of inherent powers in
order to avoid an imminent threat to the safety of the nation.
However, the inquiry does not end here. We must now measure the
beliefs of past commanders-in-chief against the doctrines established by
case law. Steel Seizure's majority broadly rejected this notion of
inherent powers, regardless of the particular crisis facing the nation,
when it held that Truman's power to seize the steel mills must have
explicitly come from an act of Congress or the Constitution. 127 Judge
120. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 28.
121. See Monaghan, supra note 8, at 27.
122. 88 CONG. REC. 7044, supra note 1.
123. See MARCUS, supra note 59, at 80.
124. See Lincoln, supra note 1.
125. See 88 CONG. REC. 7044, supra note 1.
126. See MARCUS, supra note 59, at 11.
127. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 585
(1952).
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Taylor found similarly in ACLU, when she held that there were no
inherent powers apart from those derived from the Constitution.1
2 8
Though these opinions are not in accord with previously cited
presidential authority, if studied closer, they do not actually foreclose all
possibility of inherent powers. Both opinions state that any powers of
the President must be found within the Constitution or congressional
statute. 29  Unlike Article I, which explicitly lays out the scope of
congressional powers, Article II begins: "The executive power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America."' 30 It goes on to
say that the President is the commander-in-chief of the army and navy.'31
With the exception of a few stated duties that the President must
perform, the Constitution is largely silent as to the extent of his powers,
other than to require a sworn statement that he will "preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution of the United States."' 132 Therefore, other
than his power as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President
has no other powers explicitly granted by the Constitution. As such,
rather than viewing Steel Seizure and ACLU to say that the President has
no inherent powers, 133 they are perhaps more appropriately read as
merely stating that the powers vested in the President by the Constitution
do not contain the power to nationalize the steel industry or intercept
electronic communications without a warrant. 1
34
This alternate understanding of those holdings allows for a further
thesis: the inherent powers of the President-those that necessarily
follow from the power vested in Article II-may vary depending upon
current exigencies facing the nation. That which is necessary to "defend
the Constitution of the United States"' 35 is surely different in peace time
than in war time. This disparity would be even further increased if the
nation were at war with itself, as it was during Lincoln's presidency, than
if it were engaged in a foreign peacekeeping mission. As such, the
powers necessarily granted to the President by the Constitution depend
largely on the current climate of the nation.
This view follows both the previously mentioned presidential
128. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 781
(E.D. Mich. 2006).
129. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 587; see also ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 781.
130. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
131. See id. at § 2, cl. 1.
132. Id. at § 1, cl. 8.
133. To clarify, this Comment previously defined "inherent powers" as those
necessarily implied by various clauses of the Constitution; therefore, this statement may
more accurately read "As such, rather than viewing Steel Seizure and ACLU to state that
the President has no powers implicitly conferred on him by the Constitution."
134. See generally Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579; ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754.
135. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
2007]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
thought, as well as the beliefs of various Supreme Court Justices. In his
concurrence to Steel Seizure, Justice Jackson stated that "any actual test
of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables."' 36  Jackson went on to cite Lincoln's
suspension of habeas corpus as one such example of where presidential
power depended on the particular events facing the nation.1 37  Justice
Souter also would seem inclined to follow this notion, as he spoke in his
concurring opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld of certain exigent
circumstances where the executive may have some emergency powers
that would be unavailable at other occasions.
138
Thus, it seems that both presidential and judicial authorities would
agree that in certain emergency situations, the President may utilize
powers inherent in his office that would not be available on other
occasions. Therefore, the question now becomes: what circumstances
would justify this extension of powers, and how far are they to be
extended? Many instances questioning the authority of presidential
action concern actions which infringe upon individual rights.
139
Therefore, any workable framework for inherent powers must be able to
determine the circumstances under which inherent presidential power
may violate constitutional protections.
C. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: Carving Out an Inherent Power
Exception to Constitutional Rights
In striking down inherent powers arguments in ACLU, Judge Taylor
relied heavily on the intrusion of such powers upon individual
freedoms.1 40 Though judges and academics make sweeping statements
concerning inviolate constitutional rights, the reality is that constitutional
freedoms are not absolute; they are often limited by necessary
circumstances. 141  If police officers are able to undertake an action
136. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
137. See id. at 637 n.3.
138. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).
139. See MARCUS, supra note 59, at 234 ("In [Steel Seizure], private individuals (the
steel companies) had asserted that their property had been taken by the Executive without
proper authority."); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 464 U.S. 654, 670 (1981)
(President Carter's blocking removal of Iranian property within United States
jurisdiction); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (President Lincoln's suspension of
habeas corpus); ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d. at 758 ("Plaintiffs have alleged that the TSP
violates their free speech and associational rights, as guaranteed by the First
Amendment... [and] their privacy rights, as guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment....").
140. See ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d. at 781 (holding that the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments are fully applicable to Executive actions).
141. See generally Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (acknowledging "plain
view" exception to Fourth Amendment warrant requirement); United States v.
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facially in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but are justified through
the carving out of one of many judicial exceptions, it stands to reason
that the President would have such a power during a national emergency.
One such exception, relating to vehicle checkpoints set up by police, is
readily applicable to inherent powers analysis.
Though facially unrelated, the constitutional issues addressed in
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond are largely the same as those found in
ACLU.142  Both concern the Fourth Amendment protections of the
Constitution, and in both cases, warrantless seizures were attacked and
declared unconstitutional. 143  Specifically, Edmond concerned drug
interdiction checkpoints on roadways. 144 At these checkpoints, officers
would stop a predetermined number of cars, ask for the license and
registration of the driver, and check for noticeable signs of driver
impairment. 145 One officer would make an open-view examination of
the vehicle from the outside, while another walked around the car with a
drug-sniffing dog. 146 Two individuals stopped at one such checkpoint
brought suit against the City of Indianapolis, alleging violations of their
Fourth Amendment rights against search and seizure.1
47
Noting that a search or seizure is typically unreasonable in the
absence of individualized suspicion of wrong-doing, 48 and that it was
well-established that highway stops were seizures under the Fourth
Amendment, 49 the Court looked to determine whether such a checkpoint
nevertheless fell within one of the limited circumstances where the
general rule did not apply. 50  Such circumstances included occasions
where the particular practice attacked "was designed to serve 'special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement."""' Checkpoints at
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (recognizing search incident to lawful arrest exception to
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23
(1973) (holding that First Amendment protections do not apply to obscene material);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) ("No
government.., should be forced to choose between repressing all material, including that
within the realm of decency, and allowing unrestrained license to publish any material,
no matter how vile.").
142. Compare Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (finding that highway
drug interdiction checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment), with ACLU, 438 F. Supp.
2d at 782 (holding that warrantless wiretaps of international phone calls violate the
Fourth Amendment).
143. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48; see also ACLU438 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
144. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
145. See id. at 34-35.
146. See id. at 35.
147. See id. at 36.
148. See id. at 37.
149. See id. at 40.
150. See id. at 37.
151. Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)).
2007]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
borders and driver intoxication checkpoints were among those cited by
the Court as instances of programs serving such special needs.1 52 Unlike
those approved instances, the Court found that the checkpoint in question
in Edmond was established merely to uncover evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing. 153 There was no special interest or purpose that the
checkpoint was trying to serve. Therefore, absent individualized
suspicion, such checkpoints were in violation of Fourth Amendment
protections.154
Such analysis can easily be applied to the facts in ACLU. Both
cases arose from alleged violations of Fourth Amendment protections.
As previously mentioned, ACLU concerned warrantless intercepts of
international phone and internet communications.155 While there was
some level of suspicion involved, as the TSP program required that there
be reasonable governmental suspicion that one of the parties to the phone
or email communication was an agent of al-Qaeda or affiliated terrorist
organizations, 156 the lack of judicial protections (such as a warrant
requirement) indicated that this "reasonable suspicion" need not
approach the level of probable cause. As previously mentioned, the
amount of suspicion actually required to be considered reasonable for the
purposes of intercepting a communication is unknown. 57  This
determination was to be made by government agents; however, "the
Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of
Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates.,'158 Therefore, such
searches are facially unreasonable without a warrant.
However, as acknowledged by Edmond, certain circumstances
allow a warrantless search to be effected constitutionally. Plain view,'
59
exigent circumstances, 160 searches incident to legal arrest,' 6' automobile
152. See id. at 39 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545-50
(1976) (holding that checkpoint served a border control function necessary to guard entire
length of border) and Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 450 (1990)
(holding that checkpoint served purposes of detecting signs of intoxication and removing
such motorists from the road)).
153. See id. at 42.
154. See id.
155. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758
(E.D. Mich. 2006).
156. See Gonzales, supra note 97.
157. See id.
158. See ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d. at 775 (quoting United States v. U. S. Dist. Court
for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972)).
159. See generally Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) (holding that seizure
of a pipe and marijuana seeds from a student's dorm was constitutional as they were in
plain view when the student let the officer into the room).
160. See generally Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (upholding warrantless
entry and search of a house believed to hold a robber immediately following a robbery
due to exigent circumstances).
[Vol. 112:1
To PRESERVE, PROTECT, AND DEFEND
searches,1 62 and stop and frisk procedures 63 are all long-held exceptions
to the general warrant requirements. Though the Fourth Amendment
would seem to mandate warrants for all of those situations, the Supreme
Court has held that for various reasons, warrants are not required to make
such a search or seizure.
In ACLU, the Government attempted to assert that the inherent
power of the President is another such exception, allowing government
agents to violate Fourth Amendment protections. 64 Though the court
struck down this argument, refusing to establish a per se exception to
constitutional protections under the guise of inherent presidential
powers,165 the inherent powers argument is not entirely foreclosed.
Judge Taylor, in ACLU, spoke of inherent powers largely in sweeping,
grandiose terms; presumably, this style is in response to the sweeping
terms used by the Government in defending the TSP. 166  However,
according to earlier case law, it is not entirely accurate to speak of
inherent powers in such terms. In his concurrence to Steel Seizure,
Justice Jackson does not entirely foreclose the existence of inherent
powers. 167 As stated previously, when speaking of presidential action in
absence of either congressional grant or authority, Jackson finds that
"any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events
and contemporary imponderables."'' 68 If anything, this statement seems
to open the door to future arguments for presidential action independent
of specific statutory authority. When taken together with the plethora of
judicially established exceptions to Fourth Amendment protections, it
seems reasonable to argue for a sort of "presidential exigent
circumstances" exception to certain Constitutional protections. While
such an exception certainly would not be so broad as to allow for
seemingly any violation of the Constitution that the President viewed as
necessary, the exception-if well-constrained-may allow for avoidance
of Justice Souter's theoretical "imminent threat to the safety of the
161. See generally United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (upholding felony
arrests without a warrant).
162. See generally California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (upholding warrantless
search of motor home as ready mobility of automobile justifies lesser degree of
protection).
163. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting a reasonable search
of stopped individual for weapons for protection of officer with reason to believe
individual is dangerous).
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Nation." 169
D. Establishing the Framework: A Strict Scrutiny Approach
Having demonstrated that such a framework of inherent powers
could pass Constitutional muster, we now turn to the task of actually
establishing the framework. When determining the constitutionality of
warrantless searches and seizures in particular situations, the Supreme
Court has been forced to balance individual rights with interests of crime
control, safety of officers, protection of the public, and destruction of
evidence, among other interests.170 In Terry v. Ohio, the Court found that
the safety of the officer when encountering a possibly dangerous
individual outweighed the individual's absolute right against warrantless
searches and seizures. "' Thus, the limited invasion upon a suspect's
rights was outweighed by the substantial threat to an officer's safety
posed by what the officer believed could be a dangerous individual.
72
The Court used similar reasoning in Edmond, when it found that
vehicle checkpoints, when established for the purposes of general crime
control, violated the Fourth Amendment. 73 In order to be constitutional,
such checkpoints must be designed to effect special needs, more than
general law enforcement. 74 Thus, the Court did not believe that general
crime control reasons were significant enough to infringe upon a driver's
Fourth Amendment rights. However, the special importance of getting
an intoxicated driver off the road would outweigh the slight infringement
of a limited stop; therefore, checkpoints for such purposes were found to
be constitutional. 1
75
This same balancing test may easily be applied to the circumstances
of ACLU. The constitutional infringement in this case is large: the right
to privacy has long been established as one of the most central tenets of
the Fourth Amendment. 76  This right to privacy must be balanced
against the purposes of the interceptions, and the governmental interest
furthered by them. 177  The government based its communication
interceptions on something called "reasonable governmental suspicion"
169. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).
170. See generally California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); Washington v.
Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
171. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
172. See id.
173. See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
174. See id.
175. See id. at 39 (citing Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 450
(1990)).
176. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
177. See id.
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that one party to the communication was affiliated with al-Qaeda.'78
Again, as the intercept program is confidential, it is unknown the level of
suspicion necessary to be considered "reasonable" to secure a wiretap.
17 9
Nowhere in the known guidelines of the TSP is there anything about
suspicion, or probable cause to find that a terrorist act will soon be
committed, or that either party to the communication has knowledge of
such an act. 180 Instead, all that is required is suspicion that one party is in
some way involved in an al-Qaeda affiliated organization.' 81 It is
similarly unknown what is meant by the term "affiliation."' 82 Must the
individual have actually participated in an al-Qaeda bombing in ordered
to be considered affiliated? Is it enough that he be related to, or live
with, a documented member of such a group? As these questions cannot
be answered by any known documentation of the TSP, the purposes of
the warrantless communications intercepts of the TSP could justifiably
be viewed as general crime control measures. As such, according to
Edmond, the TSP's stated purposes would not outweigh the significant
Fourth Amendment violation of the parties' rights to privacy.
Under this framework, in order for presidential action to be
constitutional when not taken pursuant to explicit or implicit statutory
approval, the interests served by the action must be something more than
what Edmond calls "general crime control." While any executive
supporter would be quick to label the prevention of terrorist acts as more
significant than crime control, the background principles remain the
same. The drug interdiction checkpoints were done solely to ferret out
criminal activity; there was no further purpose served by them.' 83 The
same could be said of the wiretaps in ACLU. They were not undertaken
to avert some impending national emergency; instead, they existed to
gather intelligence to prevent future, theoretical attacks. 184  Thus,
following the doctrine established by Edmond, the purposes of
presidential action must be for something other than theoretical crisis
prevention; the action must be taken to avert an imminent threat to the
safety of the nation.
As such, when the president acts in a situation where he believes
there to be an imminent threat to the safety of the nation, and violates
individual rights for the public good, he will essentially place himself at





183. See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,48 (2000).
184. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758
(E.D. Mich. 2006).
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the mercy of the judiciary if his actions are challenged, akin to the
manner suggested by Jefferson.1 85 In such circumstances, the President's
actions will be judged on the basis of the "imperatives of the events."
' 186
As with any alleged governmental infringement upon fundamental
constitutional rights, the court will perform a strict scrutiny analysis of
the President's action.' 87  Under a typical strict scrutiny analysis,
government action infringing upon constitutional rights may survive only
if it is justified by a "compelling governmental interest" and "narrowly
tailored toward the achievement of that goal.' 88 However, due to the
unique nature of the inherent power inquiry, the compelling
governmental interest must be an imminent threat to the safety of the
nation. Judges should take into account the type of threat faced, the risk
to the safety of the country, and the necessity of immediate action when
determining the imminence of the threat. Therefore, in order to survive
such a challenge, presidential action, taken under the guise of inherent
power, which violates constitutional rights must be justified by an
imminent threat to the safety of the nation, and narrowly tailored to
achieving the preventive goal.
When this framework is applied to past presidential actions justified
by an assertion of inherent powers, it becomes apparent that, in many
instances, nothing would have changed. The wiretapping at issue in
ACLU would not have survived this imminent threat approach.189 The
electronic intercepts were undertaken purely for intelligence purposes;
nowhere did the government argue that they were justified by any sort of
threat to the nation. 90 As such, the imperatives of events did not justify
infringing upon fundamental First and Fourth Amendment rights. 191
Truman would certainly have been able to make a stronger case
with the circumstances surrounding Steel Seizure, but it is still unlikely
that he would have prevailed. Applying the framework, Truman would
have had to demonstrate that there was an imminent threat to the safety
of the nation, and that his actions were narrowly tailored to prevent this
threat. In his case, the imminent threat to the safety of the nation was the
185. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 28.
186. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawycr (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
187. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that strict scrutiny is limited to issues concerning fundamental constitutional
rights).
188. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
189. See Gonzales, supra note 97.
190. See id.
191. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d. 754, 758
(E.D. Mich. 2006).
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threat of a steel workers' strike during the Korean War.' 92 Regardless of
the justification for military action,' 93 Truman believed that a shutdown
of steel production would devastate the war effort. 94 Thus, the question
becomes whether the threat of a strike during a foreign military conflict
is significant enough to qualify as an imminent threat to the safety of the
nation. The answer is likely to be in the negative. While the Korean
War was viewed at the time to be a national emergency, the steel workers
never actually went on strike because Truman's seizure preempted any
cessation of labor. 195 Therefore, the effects of any strike on the war
effort were purely speculative. Mere speculation is not significant
enough to justify such dramatic action in order to survive imminent
threat analysis.
Assuming, arguendo, that the threat of a steel workers' strike
qualified as an imminent threat to the safety of the nation, Truman's
action would likely be unable to survive the second prong of analysis:
that it was narrowly tailored to achieving its preventative goal. The goal
of Truman's action was to prevent a strike and persuade the disputing
parties to resume collective bargaining sessions. 196 In accomplishing this
end, he took arguably the most drastic measure possible-seizing private
property.197  This sweeping action certainly could not be considered
narrowly tailored to the achievement of his goal; there were much less
restrictive alternatives available to the President, such as continued
collective bargaining and using procedures of the Taft-Hartley Act to
obtain an injunction against the strike and force the workers to continue
production while the dispute was settled.' 98 Thus, as Truman's seizure
was not narrowly tailored, it would have failed the second prong of the
imminent threat analysis.
V. Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here?
As neither Truman's actions prompting Steel Seizure nor Bush's
192. See MARCUS, supra note 59, at 74.
193. Though history has proven that communism was not the great threat the nation
once believed it to be, the purported justifications for the military conflict do not affect its
analysis as an imminent threat under the framework. Whether the war is fought to
prevent the spread of communism, to prevent the invasion of an oil producing state, or to
depose an unfriendly dictator, the important aspects for analysis remain such variables as
the size of the conflict, its location (abroad or on American soil), the number of American
troops committed to the encounter, and the likely results of victory or defeat, among other
things.
194. See MARCUS, supra note 59, at 74.
195. Seeid. at 80.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 77.
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actions prompting ACLU would have survived the imminent threat
analysis, the following question will undoubtedly be raised: if this
framework repeatedly reaches the same answer as the courts do already,
why have it at all? The answer is remarkably simple. While the
imminent threat framework will often reach the same negative
conclusion concerning a President's exercise of power, its importance
arises from its preservation of the notion of inherent power. Judges
utilizing this analysis will not be able to make such sweeping statements
as those made by Judge Taylor in ACLU.199 While such flowery rhetoric
reads well in an opinion, it proves dangerous because it can misconstrue
the issue of inherent power. This Comment's framework will allow the
judiciary to often reach similar conclusions concerning the exercise of
executive power, but will prevent them from foreclosing the doctrine
entirely. If a case arises where the safety of the nation is truly at risk,
this framework will allow the President to act and give him the
opportunity to justify his actions if they are later challenged.
There is little doubt that our nation will continue to face threats in
the upcoming years, both at home and abroad. Though there has not yet
been an instance where presidential action would survive an inherent
threat analysis, it is undoubted that there eventually will be. When such
a situation arises, the President should be in a position where he will not
hesitate to do what is necessary to defend the nation. He must have the
power, as Souter remarked, to deter an "imminent threat to the safety of
the nation., 200 This framework can theoretically give him such power to
be judged by the "imperatives of [the] events. ' 0 ' The modified strict
scrutiny approach of the imminent threat analysis allows his actions to be
objectively judged based on the particular circumstances of the threat.
While the Executive will certainly have an uphill battle to meet this
standard, it may be met in situations where the welfare of the nation is
truly at risk. Though we surely hope a situation never arises that would
truly justify the exercise of this power, we can take solace in the fact that
in such a situation, when our nation is in its bleakest hour, the President
will have the power to pull us through our darkest days.
199. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 781
(E.D. Mich. 2006) ("[Tlhe Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and peace.").
200. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).
201. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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